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THE SOCIAL PROBLEM: LEGAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
IN ITS SOLUTIONt
CONNOR D. ROSS*
The worldwide social upheaval-the most destructive of
all time-has inspired a renewed effort to solve the problem
of our human relationships. Various arguments are being
made to point out the causes of this raging catastrophe. How-
ever wide the differences of opinion as to cause may be,
there is general agreement that some method should be de-
vised to end war for all time.
There are those who contend that this end may be ac-
complished by agreement or compact among nations. But
government itself--especially in our America-is a compact
-an agreement between individuals, as such, and the group,
as such; and the ends said to have been accomplished are
couched in platitudes noble and inspiring. These precepts of
justice have come down through the years from our fore-
bears; and, though they are generally accepted as truths in
the abstract, the assertion is not infrequent that policies that
were right in the days of the founding fathers are inade-
quate for a changing world.
Has our compact accomplished in practice the ends we
proclaim in precept and platitude? If it has, why this un-
rest and dissatisfaction? Is representative democracy an
end in itself? Can justice be established by mere majority
vote?
I. Commonplace Observations-Their Importance
Representative democracy is worth saving because our
mistakes are of our own making. We have no one to blame
but ourselves. The system avoids revolution and bloodshed.
But to undertake to establish justice among men solely by
majority vote is a futile gesture. A principle is always a
principle. If our precepts of justice do not work in practice,
they are either not precepts or we have failed to con-
struct a governmental mechanism that gives them sway. I
f Editor's Note: Because of Judge Treanor's deep interest in the eco-
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think the error lies in the construction of our social com-
pact. Until we correct our own mistakes in government, I
doubt the wisdom of the proposal to set up a compact for
the world. If we can save representative democracy by mak-
ing it work, perhaps the example would be sufficient in itself
to save the world.
I think the error in our governmental and economic
calculations is in the treatment with truths that are so com-
monplace that they have ceased to be recognized as of im-
portance. These truths are in the class described by
Samuel Taylor Coleridge as being "so true they have lost
the power of truth," having fallen into a state of "neglect
caused by the very circumstance of their universal recog-
nition." We have become so confused by the so-called "con-
ditions of a new age" that we see nothing but the conditions.
The search for cause has ceased, and, as statesmen, we re-
sort to the antiquated method in medicine of treating symp-
toms. The proposals therefore are varied and usually
meaningless.
The mention of but one example of the various pro-
posals for the cure of social ills should prove the point-
namely, that we should have either a "liberal" or a "con-
servative" or a "middle-of-the-roader" to administer the
remedy, depending upon the temperament of the persons
doing the choosing. The assumption that there could be a
liberal or a conservative or a "fifty-fifty" law should have
no more standing in the Science of Law than in the Science
of Chemistry.
In this discussion I shall attempt to pick up a few
commonplace truths and give them the prominence that I
think they deserve.
Government involves a relationship of the individual
to the group. That relationship embodies the idea of preser-
vation. In the last analysis, I think the social compact is
based on well-recognized -laws of Nature-the law of self-
preservation, said to be the first, and the law that impels every
living thing to seek the course of least resistance. It is
natural therefore for man to seek the gratification of his
desires with the least possible exertion. Both of these laws
embody the idea of saving-the saving or preserving of
life and hence the saving of labor and of property rights. It
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is this thought that suggests closer observation of the com-
monplace.
(a) Labor Saving and Lost Opportunities
There is hardly a subject upon which we have heard
more and know less, I think, than that of saving. We cut
through the field and pasture wood to save time. Benjamin
Franklin was an advocate of daylight-saving two centuries
ago. He proposed that people retire and rise early to save
candles. In our youth we were taught to save about every-
thing from sole to soul-and the story of the prodigal was
held out as a demonstration of how we could lose both. We
are taught not to eat too much nor too little if we would
save our lives. For the same reason we should exercise our
minds and muscles, but not to the extent of drudgery and
slavery. To work for the joy of the working brings forth
the man that Nature intended one to be. Slavery impoverishes
both slave and master. The drudgery of the slave is com-
pensated in the idleness of the master. Neither becomes the
man Nature ordained him to be.
In the great game of life, however, Mother Nature never
loses. She runs the table and holds the stakes. Come what
may, gains or losses, the penurious, the penniless and the
profligate, she gathers to herself and her scales are always
in balance. Her storehouse is ever full and overflowing.
She ever provides enough-more than enough-to go round.
But she does not concern herself with the parceling out of
her bounty in distributive shares. If we promote a system
under which one may be master and grasp that which he
does not earn, then another must accept less than he earns-
and each must take the punishment. Neither has lived the
man he was capable of living. There was no saving in
either case.
If activity, mental and physical, is beneficial and drudg-
ery detrimental to mankind, there must be a place in Nature's
set-up for wholesome pleasure.
Labor-saving devices therefore would seem to have a
place. If not, then all our teaching has been in vain-and
the farmer should go back to the grub-hoe, the operator of
the steam shovel to the pick and spade, and the housewife
to the spinning wheel.
The user of the labor-saving device should get as much
satisfaction out of operating it as the inventor enjoyed in
1942]
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devising it, and both should have more leisure and the joys of
living than they had before. The burden bearers-the slaves
to drudgery-should derive as much satisfaction in helping
make the devices as either the inventor or the operator. In
turn, all these workers should enjoy life as freemen-the
free indeed whom the truth has made free.
How can we have labor-saving devices and still have
enough work to go round? Before that question we stand
perplexed and seemingly helpless. The answer is: there is
not enough drudgery to go round. There is, however, enough
work, pleasure and opportunity to go round. The unnecessary
burden of toil is no more befitting now to the highest ideal
of creation than it was to a lily two thousand years ago.
If Nature still has in her grasp all the losses and gains,
then the saving of lives from drudgery and slavery is com-
pensated or reflected in the opportunities thus opened up for
pleasure, recreation, and further development of the arts and
sciences. But here the question of processing the bounties
of Nature is just as it was before. Nature does not distribute;
she merely provides.
Have opportunities been lost in this transition? Ask
yourself if Invention and Discovery in opening up opportu-
nities for pleasure have not at the same time opened up
corresponding fields of activity. Would you go fishing, or
yachting, or hunting or golfing or would you prefer to
climb the Matterhorn? How would you go? By train, or
automobile or airplane? Do these things afford no work for
others? What would you take with you? Could you fish
without a pole and tackle, play ball without bat, ball or glove,
or hunt without a gun? Could you read without a book or
printed page, grow flowers without land and tools, or paint
a picture without brush and paint? If not, would you produce
yourself this equipment for exploring the new frontiers of
pleasure now opened to all-not just a few-or would you
exchange the fruits of your own labor for the equipment-
the products or the labor of others?
Why can't we---all of us--do these things now? We
have not learned the lesson of saving. We have learned only
how to abolish drudgery. There is just as much time for
activity as there ever was so far as the laws of Nature are
concerned.
Where then are these opportunities? They are all about
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us, awaiting exploration-not exploitation. The truth is we
have taken away with the one hand as fast as we have gained
with the other. The gain we have made through discovery
and invention has been lost in the social setup. Progress and
retrogression are at a sort of stalemate.
(b) Exchange-as a Labor-Saving Device
The conditions suggest a question of saving that lies
deep in our economic calculations. To illustrate, let us think
of a farmer entering upon a virgin tract of land without
improvements. In the illustration, I shall assume the
existence of a correct system and later point out the defect
in the system now in operation.
If the farmer is to operate successfully, he must have
a house, a barn, fencing and perhaps ditching and tiling. He
hasn't sufficient means to make these improvements, but he
has the ability, mental and physical, to install and pay for
them in the future. He, therefore, procures a loan-in other
words, sells bonds based on his ability together with the in-
creased utility of the farm, and agrees to pay the loan in
the future. The improvements, like the tools with which he
works, are labor-saving conveniences.
The fencing keeps his own livestock in, the other live-
stock out, and he may go about his work of raising crops
without taking time out to prevent his livestock from run-
ning wild. The drainage saves time in that he can raise a
larger and better crop in one year than, without it, he could
raise in perhaps two years. The other improvements suggest
similar advantages. Under an orderly system, he has no
doubt, nor does his creditor, of his ability to meet through
yearly installments his obligation advanced to him in the
form of a loan.
It would be impossible to determine the number of
his fellowmen that the farmer has in effect employed to aid
him in the buying and the improving of his farm, or the
number that aid him in paying for it through the exchange of
his products. Had it not been for these fellowmen whose
transactions are represented on each side of the ledger, he
would not have undertaken the venture to own the home in
the first place. In other words, the principle of saving was
the basis of the venture-saving, in the sense of establishing,
preserving, and protecting the rights of property. In the
19421
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absence of these opportunities and the security that ac-
companies them-the privilege of exchange or division of
labor-he could not stand out as the individual or the man of
which he was capable. He would have been merely a man
whose identity was lost in the group as a primitive of the
race-a savage seeking a bare subsistence by brute force.
The land would have had no distinctive character and con-
sequently no value because of the absence of the privilege of
exchange with his fellows.
Since his venture presupposes exchange or the division
of labor-a practice not developed by man in a state of
nature-it is not difficult to see that the labor bestowed
on the land by way of improvements-or labor saving devices
-caused the land to take on a value equal to the cost of the
improvements. That value merely represents, so far as the
illustration goes, the labor of himself and that of all whose
labor, directly and indirectly entered into the improvements.
That value attached to the farm-not to him.
The value of all this labor, except his own, through ex-
change has been advanced to the farmer and he has obli-
gated himself to pay off the advancement, through exchange,
in the future.
It would be an interesting but an endless task to visual-
ize the myriads of transactions involved in the farmer's
venture to own and to improve his farm as a homestead.
It would be impossible for him to trade directly with, or
to determine how much to pay, each of the men who has
contributed labor toward the venture. But it is evident,
under an orderly system, each so contributing has been paid.
The value of the work of each has been added to the
things that have gone into the improvements. To get an
idea of how this has been done, one may start with a chunk
of rough ore in the depths of the earth and trace it, through
the various processes of exchange, until it becomes installed
as a part of the fence on the farm. In each of the steps of
this long and interesting journey, the piece of ore would
advance, due to labor bestowed on it, from zero in value as a
fragment of the earth to its proportionate worth of the fin-
ished product in the form of a fence.
In this illustration of the home builder I have taken
merely a glimpse at a vast system of mutual commerce or
division of labor involved in the venture.
[Vol. 17
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(c) Natural Opportunities for Exchange
It should be observed in the illustration that the value
of one's labor is manifested objectively-that is, it attaches
to, or is reflected in or upon, objects or beings beyond him-
self. This is true even though there is a certain satisfac-
tion that comes to the laborer himself because of his own
ability and of work well done. This feeling would necessarily
be reflected to him from his fellowmen who reaped a benefit
from his good work-whether the work consisted of the
digging of a ditch, the operation of a machine, the keeping
of books, the painting of a picture, or the composition of a
masterpiece of literature or of music.
The distinction that some modern statesmen attempt
to make between "property rights" and "human rights" is
therefore, to me, a mere play upon words. The piece of ore
in place in the earth is valueless and would ever remain so
if no labor, mental and physical, were applied; and likewise
a masterpiece of music heard only* by the composer himself
would be as a light hidden "under a bushel." Human rights
involve relationships among men as social beings-that is,
they involve exchange in various forms.
It is therefore important to bear in mind that labor
properly applied always registers a value somewhere; and,
if it does, justice demands that the laborer should receive its
equivalent in return.
Exchange then, under an orderly system, should be
based on principles of justice. In each transaction the party
or parties on either side should be benefited. The benefit
arises from a difference in wants. If one receives more than
the value of his labor, physical and mental, that has gone
into the thing he exchanges, then the other must accept less.
In that event, there has been no economic gain but rather
an economic loss, since the repetition of the practice results
in many of the losers becoming dependents or liabilities of
government-aimless nobodies, paupers, defrauders or crim-
inals. That is indeed a loss.
The benefit then of free and fair exchange is that the
traders have the privilege of doing the work for which they
are respectively adapted. The privilege of exchange pro-
motes a higher standard of living through the developing
of labor saving devices, the arts and sciences, and fosters
19421
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the principle of individualism. Man, in other words, moves
out of that status of sameness to which he was doomed as
a primitive and takes on a distinctive character-whether
it be farmer, mechanic, butcher, baker, bookkeeper, preacher,
poet or a giant operator of industry.
These differences in men as members of society, in
turn, result in a breadth of differences in wants and desires
and offer vast opportunities for exchange. Mankind as
members of society therefore are in position to fit into the
full scheme of things set up by Nature. But what a weak
attempt have we made in observing, exploring and possessing
the earth upon which we live!
The earth seems to have been made right. It rolls round
the sun in such manner as to distribute heat of varying de-
grees. It wabbles just enough in the process to bring about
what man defines as seasons. In the first operation, the sun
distributes heat accurately enough that man has set bounds
with reference to temperature. The divisions of the earth
thus made, he defines as zones. Naturally enough each of
these zones is peculiarly adapted to the production of certain
things beneficial to mankind. In fact the temperature within
a particular zone varies enough that certain things may be
produced in a part of it that cannot be profitably produced
in another part.
Mankind undertakes to live in each of these zones and
in different parts of the same zone. The lower animal, as
a kind, does not do this, since, as a kind, the brute cannot
adapt himself to wide variations in climate. Why? I should
say, because man can think and the brute cannot.
Man can endure temperatures ranging from ninety de-
grees in the shade to twenty or even fifty degrees below
zero. He accomplishes this by a shift of clothing; and a
change of diet helps to an extent. In the low temperatures
of winter he needs garments of heavy cotton and wool
fabrics; and those topped with fur produced in the Frigid
Zone are not out of place. In the high temperatures of sum-
mer, the light cotton and mohair garments come into play.
In this wondrous scheme of Nature, one visions vast
and unending opportunities for exchange. Man has barely
scratched the surface of the earth upon which he lives. Any
fertile mind may add myriads of opportunities to the few
mentioned that should be opened up by reason of the dif-
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ferences in the individuals themselves and the differences in
their environment and modes of living.
(d) Exchange Is Production
Exchange is part of the work of production. If that is
not true, it would be interesting to see a line drawn that
would set apart the producers of the land. The mechanic
who devotes his talents to the making of a plow assists the
farmer in the tilling of the soil and the latter in the produc-
tion of wheat to make bread helps the mechanic make the
plow. The northern farmer in the production of wheat and
corn assists the southern planter in the production of cotton
and sugar cane and vice versa. The workers engaged in
transportation and in merchandising help all the others en-
gaged in any of these pursuits. All are co-workers engaged
in the vast system of production.
The notion then that there is conflict of interests among
these fellow workers is an astounding fallacy born of short-
sightedness and misunderstanding that treat effects rather
than cause. There is no more reason for the talk of conflict
between North and South, or East and West, than there is
for thinking of conflict between the two blades of a pair
of scissors. It would be as sensible to talk of conflict be-
tween the Frigid and the Temperate Zones.
II. Government-A- Labor-Saving Device-Defeating Its Purpose
The capacity of man to think and hence to divide or
exchange labor is the distinguishing feature in methods of
the procuring of a living as between man and the lower ani-
mal.
To limit in any way the energy of man to the satisfaction
of the wants of a bare subsistence, is to attribute mistake
to the God of Nature in equipping him with the gift of reason,
since the lower animal, owning nothing and equipped only
with bone, brawn and instinct, if undisturbed, outdoes man
in this respect. And so far as the masses are concerned,
we are wracking our brains to devise methods in order to
procure a bare subsistence.
Man's error therefore must be in his social relationships.
That error, I think, creeps in at the point where man's
method of procuring a living deviates from that of the lower
1942]
INDIANA LAW JoURNAL
animal-the difference being that man in the social order
exchanges labor; the lower animal does not. This error in-
volves .a problem of saving-one that has been ignored, but
which unfolds easily to any person who really seeks to solve it.
To treat a factor of a problem as a liability when in
truth the factor is an asset would necessarily result in con-
fusion. That is what we do as a social order. Government
has been proclaimed as a gain to mankind from time imme-
morial. Yet it is persistently asserted that it is the duty of
the citizen to support the government. It would be more
proper to say that government should support itself, so that
the citizen may support himself. If government is not at
least self-supporting, upon what grounds may it be said
to be a gain?
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then government is
an invention-a labor-saving device or arrangement; and
Sir William Blackstone, in his commentaries on the laws of
England, was right in saying that the chief accomplishment
of organized society is that it enables its citizens to engage
in "mutual commerce." I think he should have gone a step
further and said that to promote mutual commerce is the
sole purpose of government. Every able-bodied citizen of a
legal order, properly administered, is a trader. If exchange
is a part of the work of production, the accomplishment
presupposes agreement or compact to some degree-and
that in its simplest form is the beginning of government.
Government-a labor-saving device-employs citizens-
as officers, agents, employees-and capital in order to pro-
mote exchange and it is therefore a producer-a necessary
and an important factor in the vast program of production.
But statesmen are zealously striving to devise means to sup-
port this producer on the assumption that it is a liability. This
effort presents a startling contradiction.
If government was intended to promote mutual com-
merce, it will not have served its full purpose until it installs
a governmental mechanism that actually promotes a system
that admits of mutual exchanges-a system free and fair to
every citizen.
To accomplish that purpose, it must throw into discard
the time-worn notion that things which by their very nature
are not exchangeable may arbitrarily, or by government edict,
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be treated as exchangeable. What is the policy of govern-
ment in this respect?
It requires but little reflection on the commonplace to
show that government maintains a system that violates its
intended purpose. As a government, we attempt to validate
the trading of values that are not exchangeable. The res-
sult is violative of a principle that we, as Americans, have
held sacred for a century and a half-that the citizen is
entitled to live his own life, to equality of opportunity, and
to reap the fruits of his labor.
(a) Error in the Law's Definition of Property Rights
This error, I think, is chargeable to education in the
so-called Social Sciences. Among these sciences I in-
clude Law. As a lawyer, I think it proper first to put
our own house in order. I think it can be shown that our
legal philosophy has within it, and has had for centuries,
a glaring mistake in its statement and treatment of the
laws governing "property rights."
First, in the treatment of property rights, we have been
trained to think of two classes of property-"real property"
or interests of the individual in lands; and "personal prop-
erty" or rights of the individual in movable things.
Secondly, in treating with the subject, the profession
thinks only of the property rights of the individual, as an
individual. If there is any treatment or well-organized
thought upon property rights of government itself, or prop-
erty rights of the individual as a joint owner with his fellow
members of society, the treatment has escaped general notice.
I think the definitions and classifications thus made are
arbitrary, illogical and detrimental to the individual and, in
turn, to government, in that they do not square with the
real law-the law of Nature.
Aside from the fact that tangible personal property is as
"real" as a tract of land, the classification does not comport
with the purpose for which government was established. In
fact the civil law of Continental Europe has not emphasized
the distinction between "real" and "personal" property as
did the laws of.England upon which our system was founded.
The citizen's right to have and to hold real property has
occasioned much discussion by legal philosophers. Black-
stone's statement that proprietary right therein is the im-
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mediate gift of the Creator has been challenged, the argu-
ment being that the State is the source of all property rights.
John Marshall stated that "the law of property in its origin
and operation is the offspring of social state."
These opposing views, it seems to me, are both partially
right-neither exactly right-though I may appear presump-
tious in setting up my views as against such eminent author-
ity. I think each of these opposing schools of thought has
failed to point out the true reason why the social state is
concerned with the rights of the citizen in so-called real
property. I am unable to find any flaw in the argument
that "land" which, as treated by the economists, includes
all natural resources, is a gift of Nature. On the other hand
it seems clear that organized society has some claim upon
the establishment of the citizen's rights to a specific site.
That claim is not an arbitrary one-but, if properly defined
and treated, is rather in keeping with the natural right of
a man to the ownership of that which he, by the exercise
of his brain and brawn, wreits from the earth and modifies
for use.
Since government is a social compact between individ-
uals, as such, and all others acting jointly in the establish-
ment of a labor-saving device--one that provides protection,
security, the privilege of exchange-it produces a value that
is reflected on land; and, to that extent, government has a
paramount interest in land throughout its dominion. This
interest is beneficial to the individual owner, and it is as
essential to his rights that government be paid the fair
value of its contribution-no more or less-as it is for all
citizens to be paid for their contributions to the improve-
ments installed on their respective tracts wherever located.
But this principle is not recognized in our law. We do not
"render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's" and hence
cannot render to the individual the things that are his.
(b) Production-The Natural Basis of Property Rights
The correction of this error by rendering to govern-
ment and to the citizen that which is due each would recon-
cile the arguments of the opposing schools of thought in
that law would then give due credit to the handiwork of
Nature, to the individual and to the social order-to Nature,
as the source of all wealth, though not wealth in itself; to
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the individual, a producer and a consumer of wealth as
Nature made him, though without the power in a state of
nature to enforce his rights as such; to organized society, as
the protecting and enforcing agency of the rights of the
individual.
This failure of our system is partially due, I think, to
the flaw in our law in the definition and classification of
property rights.
This correction would also meet the second objection.
It seems to me that the acquirement of a property right,
whether it be in movable things or an interest in land, pre-
supposes the application of labor, mental and physical, to
some degree in modifying it for use or in reducing it to
possession. Land in itself is not wealth, since wealth is a
product of labor, and labor never did produce land-it pro-
duces land value. And land value can be made possible and
reduced to possession only by the labor of individuals, as
such, and individuals acting jointly as a social order. There-
fore both the social order and the individual have an inter-
est in land solely by reason of the fact that each has con-
tributed labor to the reducing of it to possession-that is, in
conferring upon it a distinctive character, an essential right
of man as a social being. If the laborer is worthy of his
hire in the one case, the joint laborers are worthy of their
hire in the other-to the full extent of the labor or service
rendered. It is this principle that answers the communistic
theory that land should be common property. That idea is
not only impracticable; it is in conflict with the very purpose
of government.
The classification of property as real and personal im-
poses servitude and slavery upon the majority of individuals
and is also at variance with the avowed purpose of govern-
ment, as, I think, further reflection will show.
There is no difference in principle, from the standpoint
of production, between the coat on a man's back and the
house in which he lives. Both are products of human ex-
ertion; and the materials of which they are composed were
taken-directly or indirectly-from the earth and modified
for use through the various instrumentalities of exchange.
Both the coat and the house are exchangeable. Each
of these products is a want that serves the owner in pro-
tecting him from the elements. The only difference is in
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the manner of use. In the one case the product is attached
to the person and moves about with him; in the other, the
citizen goes to it to enjoy its benefit. For the same reason
there is no difference in principle between a pile of lumber
and that same lumber in place as part of the house. But
the law treats both the coat and the pile of lumber as personal
property and the house as real property. Consequently all
of what was once personal and movable property when in-
stalled in or attached to land is defined as real property.
(c) The Commingling of Property Rights of the Citizen and the
State
The error is not merely one in tho choice of words. The
injury arises because of the erroneous classification in that
all human exertion that reflects value by way of improve-
ments on land is treated as individual property and as an
integral part of the land. But in that value of the realty
is also a value that is not the product of individual work
and hence, in the nature of things, is not an individual
property right-and all the "King's horses and all the King's
men" cannot make it so. The law merely attempts to rec-
ognize this last mentioned value as a kind of title in the
individual. This title is without flesh-a naked legal title.
The nature of this value so erroneously treated as "real
property" of the individual may be made clear by further
reflection on the illustration of the farmer in the improvement
of the farm. It is clear that the improvements installed by
him, through the advancement of credit, resulted in an in-
crease of value to the site. If this tract were still in a state
of nature, without the benefit of the protection and facilities
of organized society, we could think of the surface-and
correctly-as a plane representing zero in value. With the
coming of organized society and its facilities for the protec-
tion of property rights and the privileges of exchange, a
value settled on the land as silently and as definitely as
a blanket of snow is cast on the earth. That value was the
result of the joint endeavors and activities of citizens in the
establishment and maintenance of organized society. It may
be represented by a dotted line drawn above the plane desig-
nated as zero. Were it not for the joint activities that caused
that value, the farmer would not have dared the venture. His
work, as shown, caused an additional value to attach; and that
[Vol. 17
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value may be represented by a second dotted line drawn above
the first.
The mischief of our legal reasoning creeps in at this
point. Our boasted concept of justice takes a holiday. The
most vicious system of bookkeeping known to man comes
into play, and government gives or throws away its own
earnings.
The annual value of public service represented by the
space between the plane "zero" and the first dotted line,
throughout the land as of the year 1930, was about twelve
billion dollars, or about two billion more than enough to pay
the country's tax bill as of that year, which approximated
ten billion dollars. Government collected only about forty
per centum, or $4,800,000,000 of this value at thati time. The
citizens therefore in their joint enterprise as organized so-
ciety lost about $7,200,000,000 of their joint annual earn-
ings. The year 1930 is used because our present meth-
ods of raising revenues are so far afield that, I think, no
one could hazard a guess as to the extent of the error. To
say that this error is immaterial because this amount goes
into the hands of a small minority is as illogical as to say
that a private corporation is not injured by giving to a
small minority of its stockholders sixty per centum of its
earnings.
Any individual or company that would so manage his
or its business would go into bankruptcy. But government,
under our man-made laws, has power that the individual or
company does not have-the power of taxation. To attempt
to make up this loss, government resorts to regulative tax-
ation on the processes of exchange by the enactment of in-
come, sales, license, stamp and various other taxing laws
each of which burdens the legitimate processes of exchange
by causing an arbitrary raise of price. The result is that
government, instead of promoting exchange, slows down and
impedes it, and hence defeats its own purpose.
This reasoning by our citizenship, directed, of course,
by leaders supposedly learned in statecraft, to say the least,
displays a startling omission to apply commonplace knowledge
to the affairs of government. The average citizen knows the
effect of an arbitrary raise of price of an article for which
he has need. He either postpones the purchase or drops
the desire for it entirely. He also knows that if three men
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work jointly and one receives all he earns and half or more
of the earnings of the other two-and that method of dis-
tribution is continued-the two must exist on less than they
earn. The other, since he cannot eat, wear, and use much more
than either of his co-workers, can eventually retire and live
on so-called savings that he did not earn. The two will
barely exist, or become objects of charity, and hence become
perfect subjects for the solicitude of that modern school of
statesmanship that proposes by some magic power to capi-
talize inactivity-the rampant pension and dole advocates.
This explains on a small scale the result of the failure
of government to collect in full the annual use value, at a
current rate of interest, of its public service. Since the
public account does not balance, government resorts to regu-
lative taxation. The cost of production-including exchange-
necessarily raises. Citizens as an aggregate are unable to buy
back all they are able to produce as an aggregate-equipped
as they are with efficient' labor-saving devices-markets
abroad are lost, and foreign producers successfully invade
our own markets. Unemployment and under-consumption,
twin evils of social mismanagement, spread their deadly
effect throughout the land. The vicious cycle goes on and
on until we as a people have succumbed to the notion that
time itself is measured in alternating periods of prosperity
and depression.
III. The Problem Reduced to Statement
Since labor properly directed, reflects value, and justice
demands that the producer shall have the benefit of that
value, it follows that government in failing to collect the
returns upon its own service is in the position of a careless
person that loses his earnings as fast as he makes them.
The difference is that society permits the individual loser
to recover against the finder but legalizes the title of its
own earnings in the hands of the individual. Under our
system therefore a public product is capitalized as individual
property and is bought and sold as such, though it is not in
fact exchangeable. Our citizens therefore-as traders in
their various capacities-must pay individuals for conven-
iences afforded by the whole community in the prices for
places upon which to build and work and live. In this vicious
process in drawing upon individual earnings to retrieve the
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loss, production is caught between two millstones. The sug-
gestion that "we have solved the problem of production
and now we must solve the problem of distribution" is an
idle boast. We have solved neither of these problems. We
merely know how to make things and it is utterly impossible
to distribute equitably because, as a matter of simple mathe-
matics, we can't under our system of legislative bookkeeping.
The cruelties of government in the control of its sub-
jects have long since passed out; and the power of taxation
is the only practicable method of depriving the citizen of
rights and opportunity. This encroachment, I think, is due
to the confusion of the purpose of government with func-
tions of its parts or mechanisms. If we would think of
government as a marvelous machine constructed, maintained
and operated for one purpose-to promote exchange-there
would be no occasion for confusion.
As an instrumentality of exchange, government accel-
erates and it regulates. It is the purpose in this discussion
to deal largely with the activities resorted to for the purpose
of raising revenue.
To accelerate exchange, government should be able, as a
producer, to go forward on its own power. This it can do, as
shown, by the collection and use of its entire annual earnings.
It should also be equipped with a device for slowing down or
even stopping in the dangerous places where that result is
proper. Vehicular traffic of a century ago was equipped
with both devices. The farmer of that period knew the
difference in the uses of a whip and a rub-brake. He knew
that a rub-brake clamped against a wheel would slow down
or stop forward motion-and that result was desirable at
times in the interest of progress. Regulatory taxation is
the rub-brake on the wheels of exchange. Only statesmen
and economists fumbling with governmental mechanism try
to make a rub-brake serve as an accelerator.
The power of regulation, properly directed, has various
laudable applications. It has uses preventive and corrective
known as "police powers," and these, in the last analysis,
serve the same purpose-protection.
In the exercise of the first of these, government takes
time by the forelock in its endeavor to develop a better
citizenship and thus avoid resort to the corrective measures.
As an example, government promotes and fosters the public
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school system on the theory that it is a refining influence
and hence a good investment. The citizen is thus relieved of
the duty of educating his own children. He attains a better
result through exchange.
The maintenance of facilities for the care of the disabled
and the incompetents serves a like purpose. Under an or-
derly system, government cares for the disabled, not solely
for their benefit but for the same reason that it institutes
health and safety measures or drains a swamp or constructs
sewage facilities-to protect the rights of the citizens general-
ly in the exercise of the privilege of mutual commerce. The
institutions maintained for impounding criminals are ex-
amples of the corrective facilities. Regulation of dangerous
practices or businesses is also proper under the police power.
For instance, dynamite is a useful, labor-saving device, but
its production and use require regulation. A farmer by its
use could perhaps clear a field of rocks or stumps in a week
and thus avoid months of burdensome toil. He can well
afford to pay for the regulation.
Some of these activities are not inherently dangerous
and hence should not be penalized. The cost of maintenance
should be met by the annual earnings of government. Prac-
tices and things that, by their nature, are hazardous and
dangerous should be slowed down by regulatory penalties.
Others are wholly detrimental and should be stopped com-
pletely under the power of government to define crimes.
Though regulation of activities may seem an interference
at times with individual property rights, the distinction is
that there is no vested property right in activities that are
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or conven-
ience.' If that distinction were always as a matter of cold
logic kept in mind the majority of our regulative measures
would pass out.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, I think the social
problem-which is merely the problem of living-should be
reduced to a definite statement so that the citizens and their
public servant would at least have a better conception of the
end to be attained. That practice is not new in other fields
of science and no one would contend that the other sciences
are not far in advance of the so-called social sciences. Though
this statement might be considered as purely economic, I
think it involves legal principles. In fact I do not see how
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Law can be disassociated from the broader science known as
Sociology. I shall undertake to state the problem and in the
statement I shall use words that require definition.
Human energy applied to the resources of this earth
produces wealth. "Wealth" consists of things that satisfy
human wants, such as food, clothing, shelter, books-in fact
all the necessities and luxuries of life-and also tools and
equipment used in the production of these wants and desires.
The tools and equipment of industry I understand to be
"capital"; hence capital is a part of wealth. The return upon
human energy is "wages" and, since capital is but the ex-
tension of human energy into tools and equipment, the re-
turn upon capital is in fact wages, though it is usually
defined as "interest."
Human energy in the social order is dual in character-
individual and social. The earnings in each of these capaci-
ties are separate and distinct; and hence all the wages of the
individual as such belong to, and should be credited to, the
individual. All the earnings or wages of government should
be collected by government and used solely for one purpose-
to pay the cost of government; in other words, we should
"render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's." The
wages or earnings of government I understand to be "eco-
nomic rent" or the value of public service reflected on sites
or locations, it being similar in character to the value that
attaches to land by reason of the building of improvements
by an individual, except that economic rent is the result
of community activity and hence iTfcapable of being
distributed among the members of society who jointly pro-
duce it; while the value of governments made and used by
the individual may be, and should be, separated and credited
to him in full.
To accomplish these purposes, I think we should have a
rule of procedure, constitutional in character and under-
standable. I think the Constitution contains such a rule
under a proper construction of its provisions. I shall un-
dertake to state a rule; and, until I am convinced of error
or until it is better stated, I shall contend that this rule
should govern our legislation:
Wants and desires produced through individual effort-
wealth--necessary to the life or helpful in the improvement
of the mind or beneficial to the health and happiness of
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citizens, or any individual labor or service of any kind, either
direct or in the form of capital, used or employed in the pro-
duction and exchange of such wants and desires should not
be taxed or penalized in any manner.
From this rule, two corrollaries necessarily follow:
First, regulatory taxation under the police power, which
curbs or limits exchange, should be applied sparingly and
then only to practices, enterprises or things that, without
regulation, are detrimental or hazardous to the public health,
safety, morals or convenience. Practices wholly detrimental
should be subjected to prohibitive penalties under the ad-
ministration of criminal laws.
Secondly, government, being a corporation designed to
aid man in the production of wealth, has an earning capacity
equal to the cost of operation; hence, the earnings or wages
of government-economic rent-should be collected in full at
an annual rate based on its value, in the manner that interest
is collected on capital, and used solely for the payment of
such cost.
IV. The Rule In Operation-Its Effects
The statement of the problem and the rule, I think, pre-
scribes merely a method of procedure to harmonize our
law and economic policy with truth. I think some of the
older legal philosophers were correct in their conclusion
that, in the last analysis, sovereignty does not reside in the
people. If it does, then, as suggested by Philomen Bliss, the
citizen becomes both sovereign and subject-a contradiction
in terms. He reasoned therefore that the genius of Solomon
was not displayed in his judgment that awarded the child
to the mother as against the claim of an impostor, but rather
in the startling method-the procedure-he adopted for the
discovery of truth. Solomon in all his glory and with all his
power could only enforce, he could not make, the law that
bound the child to the mother. That law had existed in
nature since the morning of time. In other words, Solomon
bowed to the real Sovereignty-Justice.
Justice, always on the throne, is not deceived by legis-
lation bearing high-sounding names. Conditions often re-
ferred to as injustices are merely the effects of Justice at
work meting out punishment.
Though a regulatory device accomplishes what the name
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implies, we persist in applying it indiscriminately to prac-
tices-good and bad. The assumption seems to be that it
will by some magic power not only withhold its curbing ef-
fect in the one case and not in the other but will grind out
revenue in abundance in both cases. It is not strange there-
fore that the old argument against "double taxation" has
succumbed to the onslaught of the tax experts, whose cry for
a "broadening of the tax base" was to solve forever the tax
problem. Nor that text writers and digesters in lengthy and
fine-spun argument attempt to define and distinguish taxing
laws with reference to kind and character. But, when all is
said, any thinking person without strenuous effort may
apply the rule and determine for himself that there are but
two general classes and that mere names serve no purpose
other than to burden the memory and confuse the mind.
One of these methods is regulatory and operates in the
nature of a penalty upon the products of individual labor.
The other, strictly speaking, is not a tax at all. It amounts
merely to the collection by government of wages and interest
for services rendered as a producer. In the complete adop-
tion of the latter method lies the only hope for the realiza-
tion of the slogan that "every citizen should contribute to
the government in proportion to the benefits received."
The attempts to put this slogan into practice, however,
display little conception of the purpose of regulation and
certainly less observation of its effects. One example will
suffice. As a government, we reason that citizens operating
motor-driven vehicles should build and maintain the high-
ways through taxation on motive power. The assumption
seems to be that the farmer in the trucking of grain, vege-
tables and livestock to the cities confers no benefit on the
city dweller who owns no vehicle save a baby cab. Are not
all the users of the highways in some manner exchanging
their labors? Are not we all, directly or indirectly, users
of the highways and transportation facilities of every kind?
Are not the pleasure seekers putting men to work in every
branch of the automobile industry?
The rule recognizes that the interests of our citizenship
are relative-not in conflict. This simple truth, though
generally conceded, has been strangely neglected in practice.
Proposals have been made and enacted purportedly to re-
lieve the home owner from burdensome taxation. It is gen-
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erally known that the acquirement of a home by the aver-
age wage earner is much too difficult. But, strange to say,
the attempts to encourage the home owner have so far failed
to recognize that it is equally important to cease the penal-
izing of the operators of business and industry. The attempt-
ed distinction between business property and homesteads in
some of these proposals ignores the fact that a place to work
is as important as a place to live and that to penalize busi-
ness and industry is to penalize citizens generally as traders.
Instead of promoting home ownership, our present policies
are encouraging speculation by individuals in vast tracts of
land, thus establishing a system that will lock the door of
opportunity for generations. '
The proposed rule recognizes that citizens are engaged
in a common enterprise. The practical operation of the rule
may be stated as follows:
Industry-whether farming, manufacturing, merchan-
dising, transportation or what not-and also the home owner
and the tenant, wherever located, would be relieved of all
taxation, except upon the dangerous enterprises and things
logically falling within the first corrollary; and would pay
only the annual use value of public service reflected on the
sites owned, used or occupied by them respectively. In the
case of the tenant, he would merely hand this annual use
value to the owner, together with the interest or rent charge
on the buildings and improvements of every kind installed
by the owner. The owner in turn would hand the amount
due for public service to the government, retaining all the
interest on his own investment. This value of public service,
since it attaches to the legal title to sites, is used by the
tenant to the same extent as though he owned the land; hence
the owner collects and the tenant pays for the public
service. One of the destructive fallacies of modern reasoning
would pass out-that is, the notion that the property owner
large or small, or the tenant, is aided by a tax on intangibles,
such as mortgages. The assumption seems to be that a
mortgage for $5,000 on a tract and the improvements worth
$10,000 has the magic power to bring into being taxable
property of the value of $15,000. The effect, however, is
to place an additonal burden on the user of the property,
since the tax is added to the interest rate and he pays it
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as interest. The same reasoning applies to numerous appli-
cations of our taxing regulations.
The adoption of the rule would introduce the man that
nobody seems to know-the individualist. That is true be-
cause his antagonist has mentally constructed a monstrosity
-half socialistic and half that indefinable something dubbed
as capitalistic-and has named it "individualistic." The in-
dividualist, as currently described, seems to be found in a
one-sided battle waged in the jungle between a giant armed
with a knotted club and an unarmed pygmy; or-to make the
picture more modern-a struggle in which the giant operator
of industry wields a legalized economic club against his help-'
er. The critics of individualism have not as yet stated just
which one of these is the individualist. It is only by inference
that the giant in either case is the guilty one.
The pity of all this is that those purporting to champion
the right of every man to live his own life in his own way
and to reap all the fruits of his labor, mental and physical,
have in effect accepted the gage of battle as thus drawn.
Of course, they have lost the argument, made as self-con-
stituted proxies for the individualist. The true individualist
is as strange to a faulty social system as he was to the
jungle. Those who think they see him in either the man
that gets more, or the man that gets less, than the fruits of
his labor have their telescopes trained in the wrong direction.
Another false assumption closely akin to this is that
there is such a thing as a "capitalistic system of government"
-and our system is referred to as such. The assertion, to
me, is beyond intelligent comprehension. I see no difference
in principle between a gardener employing capital in the
form of a wheelbarrow and the operator of a factory em-
ploying capital to make the wheelbarrow. It is the business
of government to see that each shall have the opportunity
to reap the fruits of his labor, including the labor extended
into his tools and equipment. But certainly a method of
production through the use of tools cannot be correctly clas-
sified as a form of government. If it can, then at what
point since man used a forked stick as capital did the cap-
italistic system begin, and in what land is capital not used
in the production of wealth?
The rule recognizes that every able-bodied citizen is a
producer and a consumer and hence a unit composed of sup-
1942]
INDIANA LAw JOURNAL
ply and demand. "Supply" and "demand" then are inter-
changeable terms and, under a just economy, would be in.
balance. The real medium of exchange is human exertion
and not money.
The scholastic economists, I think, have made the social
problem entirely too difficult. They have asserted for years
that there are three factors of production--"land," "labor"
and "capital," which are reflected in "rent," "wages" and
"interest." It is obvious that "production" depends solely
upon man. The assertion that man cannot produce wealth
-that is to say, he cannot live-without access to land is
self-evident. It would be equally enlightening to say that
one's arm cannot function without access to his body. Man,
as a physical being, is a part of the earth, and hence land
is presupposed.
The mischief in the treatment of land as a factor of
production lies in the disposition of its corresponding elemen-
tal-"rent." The economists treat this return in exactly
the same manner as it is treated in the science of Law. It
is at this point that Education in the Law and Economics
should get together and compare notes. If the error does
not lie in the system of bookkeeping previously pointed out
in this discussion, then the scholars should tell us where
it does lie. The assumption that Economics must forever
be the "dismal science" is not very satisfactory to inquiring
minds. If that be the answer, then this analysis at least
has merit in this: it has never been tried.
The result of the adoption and approval of this error
by the social sciences is that the processes of exchange have
ever been off balance-and the effects break out in varied
and ghastly forms. The effects can be partially identified
by the governmental agencies devoted to social service of
varied and numerous types. The error has also resulted in
the announcement of so-called laws by the economists that,
I think, are but the effects of the violation of law. The so-
called law of "supply and demand" is meaningless. The same
is true, I think, of the "law of money" to which has been
attached the name of its purported discoverer-Gresham.
That "law" is to the effect that cheap or over-valued money
will drive out of circulation good or under-valued money.
What is "cheap" money? It would seem that this purported
law presupposes arbitrary action-that is, the over-valuation
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of one kind of money with'reference to another. If a bushel
of corn were arbitrarily made by law in a given locality the,
equivalent of a bushel of wheat, the effect there upon the
trading of corn and wheat could hardly be said to be a law.
If it could, then the first trader taking advantage of the ef-
fect by exchanging wheat in a normal market for corn and
paying his debts in the abnormal market with corn should
be credited with the discovery of the law. If the first effect
constitutes the "law of money" then the latter constitutes
the "law of grain." It would seem more proper to say the
arbitrary action in the first instance was just another at-
tempt of man to make law, and let the subject rest.
The attempts of man to make and to announce laws
demonstrate the crying need for a rule to test or measure
proposals offered for the common good. The statement of
a rule necessitates the placing of first things first. Reason
would therefore seem to dictate that we cut through the
nonessentials to the prime function of government-produc-
tion. And that is to say, there is but one factor that counts
in the economic process-human energy. But, since human
energy in the legal order is exercised in two capacities-dis-
tinct and separate-Education in the social sciences should
revise its system of bookkeeping.
V. Is The Rule Within The Constitution?
The purpose of the criticism of Education in the social
sciences was to take apart the problem and to show the cor-
rectness of the rule as a legislative yardstick. We should
know what has been done to determine how much, if any, of
the social structure may serve as a foundation upon which
to build. If the forefathers erred, we should know wherein
they erred. If the Constitution needs amendment, we should
know why and in what particular it fails.
The forefathers had a slogan. Fortunately we can in-
terpret its meaning from their conduct. Their slogan was
"taxation without representation!" The assumption now
seems to be that the colonists complained solely because they
were "without representation." Would representation have
rendered the tax holy? "Representation" could hardly glorify
the imposition of taxing measures that out-George King
George and his ministry in their wildest moments.
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The colonists' complaint was against taxation. They
evidently thought representation would at least give them an
opportunity to be heard. George Washington, as early as
1765, made clear his views on the Stamp Act in a letter to
a British uncle of Mrs. Washington. Thayer's "George
Washington" quotes him as saying the colonists looked upon
the act as an "unconstitutional method of taxation." The
letter further states "*** the advantage accruing to the
Mother Country will fall greatly short of the expectation of
the ministry *** that an whole substance does already in a
manner flow to Great Britain, and that whatsoever contrib-
utes to lessen our importations must be hurtful to their
manufacturies." The letter then points out that the colon-
ists would cease to buy the luxuries produced in England and
that the "necessaries of life" could be produced at home. "If
Great Britain, therefore, loads her manufacturies with heavy
taxes, will t not facilitate these measures?", he asked, fol-
lowing his statement that the policy would stimulate like
industries in the colonies.
Our America, through like methods of taxation, now
occupies the place of England in this reasoning of Washing-
ton. If there are those who doubt, they should step into a
modern grocery store and ask for a carton of meat packed
in Uruguay or the Argentine. Government reports of the
importations of grain and other farm products might also
prove of interest.
The forefathers wrote into the Constitution the fifth
amendment, which, like that in the constitutions of the states,
recognizes the rights of the citizen to "life, liberty or prop-
erty" and provides, "Nor shall private property be taken
by law for a public use without just compensation."
The intent then of the founding fathers to protect prop-
erty rights of the citizen is plain, since the "just compensa-
tion" clause not only recognizes the existence of such rights
but protects them even as against confiscation by the gov-
ernment. It would seem then that if the government, under
the taxing clauses, may in effect take private property under
the guise of taxation, the founders arrived at a paradox in
their reasoning, since the "just compensation" clause and
the taxing clauses would be in conflict. The explanation in
some of the adjudicated cases that the power of eminent
domain is one principle and that of the taxing clauses is
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another, in an attempt to reconcile the two, is not convincing.
The explanation ignores the rule of construction that a sys-
tem of laws should if possible be construed as a harmonious
whole. It also attempts to justify the accomplishment by
indirection of that which may not be accomplished directly.
The error, I think, is due to the false assumption that
government is a liability rather than a producer. This as-
sumption never appeared more strongly, I think, than in a
recent case upholding the taxing of income of federal em-
ployees under a non-discriminatory act of the State of New
York.' The legislative policy that received judicial sanction
in that case may well be studied to prove or disprove the
rule proposed in this discussion.
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
criticises the statement of Chief Justice Marshall in McCul-
loch v. Maryland that "the power to tax involves the power
to destroy. ' '2 The remark, he says, was unfortunate and
that it was given currency "partly as a flourish of rhetoric
and partly because the intellectual fashion of the times in-
dulged a free use of absolutes ***,, But, since he admits
that the arguments in the McCulloch opinion "had their roots
in actuality,"'4 it would seem that the result reached by Chief
Justice Marshall in striking down the taxing act involved in
the McCulloch case has the approval of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter. It is therefore difficult to follow the latter's reason-
ing when he says "the web of unreality spun from Marshall's
famous dictum was brushed away by one stroke of Mr.
Justice Holmes' pen: 'The power to tax is not the power to
destroy while this Court sits.' "5 Since the Graves case rec-
ognizes more power in the legislature with reference to taxing
measures of the character involved than the McCulloch case,
one could hardly infer that Marshall's statement that "the
power to tax involves the power to destroy" was swept away
by the statement "That the power to tax is not the power to
destroy while this Court sits." Evidently John Marshall
would have approved the latter statement, though he perhaps
would not have concurred in the result reached in the Graves
' Graves v. New York ex rel. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
24 Wheat. 316 (17 U.S. 316, 1819).
3 Graves v. New York ex rel. 306 U.S. 466, 489 (1939).
4Id. at 488.
GId. at 490.
19421
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
case. This is true, I think, because the Graves case strikes
down former holdings of the Court to the effect that "the
salary of an officer or employee of one government or its
instrumentality was immune from taxation by the other."6
The majority opinion quotes from several recognized
economists. The reasoning seems to recognize "that a non-
discriminatory tax on the income of all members of the com-
munity" casts a burden upon them but to no greater extent
"than does the general taxation of property and income
which, to some extent, incapable of measurement by econo-
mists, may raise the price level of labor and materials.1
The opinion emphasizes the duty of the citizen to support
the government. To avoid the doctrine of goveinmental im-
munity, the opinion distinguishes the taxing measure on the
ground that the tax does not attach until the salary is in
the hands of the employee. The reasoning also shows that
a tax may not be imposed on the instrumentalities or the
property of government.
The concurring opinion uses this language:
"Failure to exempt public functionaries from the universal
duties of citizenship to pay for the costs of government was
hypothetically transmuted into hostile action of one govern-
ment against the other. A succession of decisions thereby with-
drew from the taxing power of the States and Nation a very
considerable range of wealth without regard to the actual
workings of our federalism, and this, too, when the financial
needs of all governments began steadily to mount."s
The economic policy back of the legislation, I think, is a
failure for reasons already stated. That a tax on individual
property raises the price of exchange is admitted. The dis-
tinction between a tax imposed on salaries of government em-
ployees and a tax on government property is not convincing,
since the property is capital or stored-up human exertion.
The fact that the tax does not attach until after the com-
pensation is in the hands of the employee does not alter the
case. The result in either case is that the employee receives
less than he earns or his salary is too high.
But, aside from all this, it would seem, that the taxation
of the salaries of government employees is illogical. The
6Id. at 481.
7Id. at 484.
3Id. at 490.
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employment by a farmer of a helper at the rate of $75 a
month on condition that the helper pay back $25 a month
for his room and board would present a case similar in prin-
ciple. The ceremony in such cases is usually simplified by
the farmer's payment of $50 a month and neither party
seems to notice any difference in the result. The govern-
ment, however, by imposing the tax incurs the cost of -col-
lection and of additional bookkeeping. But, if there is merit
in the policy, the salaries of government employees should
be increased to ten fold their present amounts and nine-tenths
taken back through taxation. The perplexing question of
the payment of the national debt would be solved.
The purpose in reciting this judicial history was to
show the trend of subsequent taxing legislation with refer-
ence to methods adopted by the forefathers for meeting the
costs of the federal government. It may be claiming too
much to say that they made no mistake in the drafting of
the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that they re-
sorted to regulative measures and those measures were ap-
plied to practices and things looked upon as harmful in the
absence of regulation. Though regulative measures are not
designed for purely revenue-raising purposes, the federal
government no doubt could have collected a sufficient amount
by such method to pay its expenses, but it should be borne
in mind that not all the evils and hence expense of the prac-
tices so regulated fell on the federal government. The inci-
dents of abuse in the use of intoxicants certainly did not. It
was not beyond the possibilities then that the federal gov-
ernment could have operated on, the taxes collected under
regulative measures if the states had confined their taxing
policies solely to the collection of wages and interest of gov-
ernment as defined in the second corollary of the rule herein
proposed. But the states, as previously pointed out, resorted
to taxing measures regulative in effect, though they were
not looked upon as such, long before the ventures by them
into fields formerly worked exclusively by the federal gov-
ernment. The deadly effect of the methods adopted by the
states was not so apparent until about the turn of the cen-
tury when the last of the homestead lands had been taken
up. These lands-the "pop-valve" of the governmental
mechanism-tended to relieve the pressure. In their going,
the pressure became more pronounced. The alternating
19421
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
shifts from so-called prosperity to depression became more
swift and frequent. The unemployment problem became
more complex, government began to expand and its needs
"began steadily to mount."
Basing my opinion on the acts, conduct and writings of
some of the founding fathers, I am not prepared to say they
did not see in the offing the conditions that beset the country.
The statements of Washington previously quoted, followed to
their logical conclusion, leads to the rule contended for in
this discussion. But let us assume otherwise. In the Graves
case Mr. Justice Frankfurter states that "the ultimate touch-
stone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it." Since taxing measures, through
the application of the doctrines of classification and of selec-
tion, have been upheld as against every kind of property
known-and as against other things not in fact property-I
ask if there is any reason why a logical and sensible classi-
fication of property for taxing legislation may not be made
on the basis of the rule herein proposed.
If there ever were ground for doubt, I think the ground
has been swept away. We wabbled into position in the adop-
tion of the Income Tax Amendment. Though the use of
the amendment has served to accomplish ends that the fore-
fathers fought, bled and died to blot out, the fact remains
we built better than we knew. Fortunately, in the adoption
of the amendment, the people did not bind the Congress to
any particular kind of income-tax measure. I think we have
not yet discovered the power of the amendment: It is a
broad one:
"The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration."' 0
The use value of "real estate" has been held to be income.
This is true with reference to residence property occupied
by the owner. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held valid an
act providing for the taxation as income of the estimated
rental value of residence property occupied by the owner.1
9 Id. at 491, 492.
Lo U.S. CONST. AMEND. XVI.
11 State ex Tel. v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N.W. 673 (1912).
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The Court reasons that "income need not be money
that which is convertible into money"'12 is income.
If the use value of residence property may be taxed as
income, then the community-made value that attaches to the
legal title to sites, exclusive of improvements made by the
owner of every kind, would be a proper subject for selection.
This value could be as readily determined as the income from
the land and the improvements. Taxing laws now provivde
for the separation of land and improvements for the pur-
pose of valuation. In special assessment proceedings, we
have for years determined just such questions.
In the case of Lutz v. Arnold13 the Indiana Supreme
Court, in stating the rule governing classification, held that
any classification is valid that rests "upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike." In a concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Treanor further states that subjects may be "selected"
for taxation.' 4 He points out that things now taxed as "prop-
erty" have not always been reached by our taxing laws. He
shows that certain kinds of "personal property" have been
omitted from, and later included in, our taxing legislation.
Is there a substantial difference between the products
of individual labor that constitute property and the product
of community activity and development? What revenue
measure in recent years has been more clearly within the
letter and the spirit of the Constitution, federal or state?
Would not that classification be better than measures that
build barriers between the states? We now accomplish by
indirection a practice that is expressly prohibited by the
Constitution-the imposition of taxes or duties by a state
as against the exports of another state. The effect, despite
fine-spun theory, is the same as legislation imposing duties
on products shipped from state to state. If our Constitution
was intended to form a more perfect union and to insure
the citizen the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of hap-
piness, why would not the freeing from taxing measures of
the necessities of life be a just and valid policy?
It follows that by proper legislation, we could eliminate
12 Id. at 691.
23193 N.E. 840, 847, 208 Ind. 480, 499 (1935).
14 Lutz v. Arnold, 208 Ind. 480, 518 (1935).
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from taxation all personal property such as food, clothing,
household goods, equipment, in fact all the necessaries of
life. These things, like buildings and improvements on and
in the land, are products of individual labor and wants that
are exchangeable. Improvements on and in the land-even
the advantage of a high state of productivity or fertility-
due to individual labor fall in that class of wealth known
as capital.
Public service afforded the user of land is also wealth.
Much of it, for instance, a paved highway, is capital. But,
since it is available to every citizen, it is not exchangeable.
It is rather a facility for exchange. It affords the same
service to a rundown farm as it does to a highly improved
farm just across the road. But we penalize the thrifty hus-
bandman and pin the medal of low assessment on the care-
less and backward.
Upon the adoption of the principle, a method of ap-
portionment among federal, state and local governments
could be worked out in much the same manner as taxes are
now apportioned between the state and local governments.
We should not lose sight of the fact that the individual
came into the social order with one hand outstretched for the
want that another could better produce. In the other hand,
he extended, or was willing to extend, the want that he could
better produce. In the last analysis, each individual is a
trader with every other. Though one may have no direct
negotiations with another, the latter trades with a third, the
third with a fourth and on and on the process may continue
indefinitely. But any alert mind, I think, can see that even-
tually there is exchange between the two that apparently
have "no dealings."
"All served, all serving; nothing stands alone,
The chain holds on; and where it ends, unknown."
The total demand of the people is the equivalent of their
earning capacity. This principle, I think, is written large in
the rule proposed for the solution of the social problem. The
principle is neither new nor old. It is a part of nature's
setup. Its force cannot be suspended by the whimsical ges-
tures of mankind. Our present methods were old-fashioned
long before the forefathers appeared on the scene of action.
They clashed with old nations. There were differences of
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opinion in their day. The differences between Washington
and Jefferson have been stressed in our political history, but
Washington thought enough of Jefferson to make him his
Secretary of State. Their differences, I think, did not ex-
tend to the regulation of individual rights. The writings of
Washington, Jefferson and Franklin show that they were
not entirely satisfied with the accomplishments of their day.
They hoped and expected that future generations would cor-
rect-not enlarge-the mistakes they could not avoid.
Has Education or Statesmanship been equal to the task?
Have we as citizens lived up to the hopes of the great cham-
pions of representative democracy?
If we cannot read the answer in the fall of empires of
an ancient day, we can ponder the ruins near at hand. In
those ruins lies the problem of living. The principle involved
in its solution was announced almost two thousand years ago:
"Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's." When
the wisdom of this "new age" catches the full force of this
admonition, a bewildered people may look into the future
with renewed hope for a better, day-a day when truth shall
triumph over error and our democracy shall "render unto
every man his due."
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